EXCISE

(4)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan have had a profound effect on regional nations -- particularly Pakistan -- and on our interests in regional security. Previously we saw this area as an important but not vital area somewhat removed from direct super power confrontation. The Soviet thrust has changed this situation. The President's State of the Union address in January signalled a strong US commitment to the security and stability of this region, and we have taken a number of steps to bolster our presence in the area and to reassure countries such as Pakistan of our commitment to their territorial integrity.

Afghanistan: The Soviets are probably in Afghanistan for an extended stay. Their immediate goals are to pacify the countryside and to secure a stable and compliant regime in Kabul. The resistance movement will probably continue tying up some 85,000 or more Soviet troops but the rebels are fragmented, lack effective national leadership, and certainly cannot force a Soviet withdrawal.

We and our allies have limited our contacts with the Afghan regime and have avoided actions which imply recognition. We still maintain a seventeen person embassy in Kabul under a charge

[redacted]

B1, A5

Our Embassy's activities, however, are severely circumscribed by security conditions and Afghan Government restrictions.

With strong Soviet support, the Government controls Kabul, but not the countryside.

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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EXCISE

There are three main issues which are likely to come up in the near future concerning Afghanistan.

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

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(2)

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(3) Finally there is the question of how to deal with various proposals concerning neutrality for Afghanistan. In an effort to encourage a political solution to the crisis, the EC-9 have floated the idea of guaranteed neutrality for Afghanistan conditioned on a complete Soviet withdrawal. Moscow and Kabul are urging regional talks which would involve international recognition of the Soviet fait accompli. These proposals will probably be discussed at the upcoming NATO meeting and at the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference in Islamabad in mid-May.

Pakistan: Among all the countries in the region, Pakistan was the most directly affected by the Soviet invasion. In mid-December the Zia Government was facing mounting opposition, but the invasion seemed to give the regime a new lease on life and defused opposition from within the military and from the conservative right. In January and February there was a sense of crisis in Pakistan and fear that the Soviets would engage in hot pursuit raids across the border and mount subversive activities in the disaffected Pakistani province of Baluchistan. That sense of crisis has subsided. To many Pakistanis the Soviet occupation now seems a fact of life and the feared hot pursuit raids have not taken place.

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Chemical Warfare and Chemical Disarmament

Unless the current negotiations in Geneva succeed in prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, a new and more dangerous phase of the arms race may be in store

by Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson

The use in war of poison gas and other chemical weapons is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which all major nations are now parties. Some nations accept the Geneva Protocol as an absolute prohibition, others including the U.S., Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and China view it as a no first use agreement, having formally reserved the right to retaliate in kind if the Protocol is violated by an adversary. Of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) only the U.S. and France have militarily significant stocks of chemical weapons. The continued existence of these weapons is based on their possible retaliatory role in the event of a chemical attack by the U.S.S.R.

Starting in 1976 the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been engaged in a series of bilateral technical discussions and negotiations in Geneva aimed at bringing about chemical disarmament including a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. (The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 already embodies such prohibitions against biological agents, but it does not apply to chemical weapons.) The bilateral talks have achieved considerable agreement on what is to be prohibited and also on the general principle of incorporating both national and international arrangements for verifying compliance. Little progress has yet been made, however, in reaching agreement on specific verification measures.

As talks continue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and concurrently within the multilateral Committee on Disarmament, which also meets in Geneva, the U.S. and its allies in NATO have embarked on a major program to enhance and modernize the protection of their forces against chemical attack. These defensive measures have found widespread support within NATO governments, which view them not only as important precautions in the present situation but also as a safeguard to be retained even if a chemical weapons ban comes into being.

Although anti-chemical protection is being supported, the U.S. has not added to its stocks of the weapons themselves since 1969. The American stockpile, although substantial, is positioned mainly within the U.S. Its ability for retaliation is limited by the missile-launch effort that would be required to deploy it to Europe under wartime conditions and by reluctance within NATO to integrate chemical weapons into the force structures and defense planning of the alliance. Requests by the U.S. Army for funds to build production facilities for a new generation of poison gas artillery projectiles, called binary munitions, have been rejected by Congress and the Administration partly on the ground that such action could impede negotiations for a chemical arms limitation treaty. Moreover, there is debate about the military value of a retaliatory chemical capability and about its possible interactions with nuclear deterrence.

In sum, the policy of the U.S. regarding chemical weapons appears to be nearing a crossroads. If a satisfactory treaty is obtained, there will be chemical disarmament. Otherwise the U.S. may decide to go ahead with the production of new chemical weapons and to make a determined effort to persuade NATO to integrate them into its defense planning. In this article we shall describe some of the technical, military and political considerations that bear most directly on the choices facing the U.S. and its NATO allies. In the wider international context there are related questions that may be no less important, but we shall not attempt them here.

Modern lethal chemical weapons are based on organophosphorus compounds known as nerve gases or nerve agents. They are chemically related to certain pesticides but are much more toxic. The first of these compounds called tabun was discovered in Germany in 1936 in the course of research on insecticides. Its military possibilities were soon recognized by the German government, which proceeded secretly to produce it and to develop production methods for a related agent found in 1938 called sarin. Although chemical weapons were used extensively in World War I, the European belligerents in World War II refrained from chemical warfare. Nerve gases in particular have never been used in combat.

Nerve gases are stored as liquids. Depending on the volatility of the particular agent they can be released from munitions as a cloud of vapor or as a spray of liquid droplets dispersed by explosive, mechanical or thermal means. They can enter the body by inhalation or by absorption through the skin. The nerve gas then exerts its lethal effect by binding to the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, thereby inactivating it. Blocking the enzyme causes a rapid accumulation of the synaptic transmitter substance acetylcholine, which normally is decomposed by acetylcholinesterase within milliseconds after being released at nerve endings. The buildup of acetylcholine at autonomic ganglia and effectors at skeletal neuromuscular junctions and at synapses in the central nervous system causes a wide array of symptoms including sweating, filling of the bronchial passages with mucus, bronchial constriction, cramping of visceral musculature, vomiting and defecation, convulsions and finally paralysis and respiratory failure. Death from acute nerve gas poisoning is caused by asphyxia, which generally will occur within a few minutes if the dose is only marginally lethal or if it is received through the skin; however, it may take up to several hours for the victim to die. There is evidence that long lasting neurological and psychiatric disorders can develop after sublethal exposure. Natural detoxification of nerve gas poisoning is slow so that the lethal dose is approximately the same whether it is received all at once or over a period of hours. Antidotes of limited effectiveness are available, but a far more effective defense against nerve gases (and indeed against all chemical warfare agents) is provided by a gas mask and, for agents that attack or penetrate the skin, by protective clothing.

Of the hundreds of organophosphorus anticholinesterases that have been considered for use as weapons three have dominated attention: their chemical names are O isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (other wise known as agent GB or sarin), O 1,2,2 trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (agent GD or soman) and O ethyl S 2 diisopropyl aminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (agent VX). It is estimated that about one milligram of sarin or 4 milligrams of VX is the median lethal dose for man, with the lethality of soman being to between. Sarin is nearly as volatile as water and would be used primarily as an area contaminant. VX, with a volatility close to that of heavy lubricating oil would be disseminated as sprays as a direct conflict hazard or as an indirect one, through contamination of the ground or other surfaces with which people might later come in contact. VX applied at about 100 kilograms per square kilometer would create a deadly skin contact hazard that would persist for a period of days or weeks, depending on the weather. The hazard from sarin being primarily an airborne one is of much shorter duration and is highly dependent on practical and horizontal air movements and on the ambient temperature, under most conditions the amount needed to create a lethal respiratory dosage would be between 100 and 1,000 kilograms per square kilometer.

Sarin and VX are the two standard U.S. nerve gases. Soman last prepared in Germany in 1944, is believed by Western officials to be the standard Russian nerve gas. The reliability of Soman approaches that of sarin, but generally persistency can be obtained by thickening it with appropriate polymers. What the Russians are reported to call VX is thought to be a methylated variation of this type. Tabun, which is less toxic than the others, but somewhat more persistent, also is stockpiled. Still another nerve gas, also known as GA, the original lethal ingredient of the U.S.S.R. chemical artillery shells, is thought to be no longer produced or maintained in the Soviet stockpile.

For use in tactical battlefield situations no other poisons match the nerve gases. Their extremely rapid mode of action, their effectiveness through the skin as well as the lungs, their early detectability (via losing low cost and their stability in storage over long periods) all combine to make them the preferred chemical warfare agents. The older agents can now be considered obsolete for the industrialized countries although some may still be retained, usually by chiefly for use against primitive peoples. Certain available Hydrogen cyanide is one example, but I chose not to discuss it here.

The nerve gases blow over and above the



NERVE GAS DISPERSED as a liquid by means of canisters at the Tooele Army Depot in Utah. The canisters hold a total of about a million gallons of agent GB, or sarin, a highly toxic organophosphorus compound chemically related to certain pesticides. The lethal dose of sarin for an adult human being is about 5 milligrams. The buildings in the distance contain additional nerve gas supplies in the form of filled munitions. The objects stacked between the watchtowers are 100-gallon aircraft spray tanks. Each such tank carries nerve gas agent VX. Approximately 40 percent of the total U.S. stockpile of poison gas, which included both empty and loaded munitions, is stored at this site and others at the Tooele Depot.

category of incapacitating agents, substances intended to put soldiers out of action for a period of several hours or days but with a low probability of death or lasting ill effects. Although many candidate incapacitants have been screened, none has proved satisfactory. The anticholinergic psychotropic drug known as agent BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) was for a time stocked in standard U.S. incapacitating munitions, but its many military shortcomings, including its unpredictable tendency to elicit maniacal behavior, led to its abandonment. The only nonlethal antipersonnel weapons now in the chemical weapons inventory of the U.S. are those employing the irritant agents CS (orthochlorobenzylidene malononitrile) and CR (dibenz[*b*,*f*][1,4]oxazepine). Also used by domestic police, they are classified as riot control agents. Although the U.S. made extensive use of CS munitions in the Vietnam war and interprets the Geneva Protocol as not applying to riot control agents, they are essentially irrelevant to combat between modern military forces because of the brevity of their effects and the protection afforded by gas masks.

The size of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical munitions is classified information, but estimates can be made from open sources. Approximately 13,000 tons of sarin were produced during the period between 1953 and 1957, and some 3,000 tons of VX were made between 1961 and 1967. About 1,000 tons of nerve gas, mostly sarin, are accounted for by the destruction of obsolete munitions and surplus stocks. Of the remainder about a fourth is held in bulk storage containers and three fourths in munitions. Approximately 30 different types of nerve gas munition have been approved for the operational inventories of U.S. armed forces over the past three decades, half of them having been produced in quantity. Some are now obsolete and have been or are being discarded. Remaining in the stockpile are about three million artillery projectiles (105 millimeter GB shells, 155 millimeter GB and VX shells and eight inch GB and VX shells), several thousand 500- and 750-pound GB aerial bombs, hundreds of thousands of two-gallon VX land mines and about 1,500 150-gallon VX aircraft spray tanks. Supplies of mustard gas dating from World War II are also maintained, both in munitions and in bulk stock, the total quantity of the agent being about the same as that of nerve gas. U.S. stocks of lethal chemical munitions total approximately 130,000 tons, reflecting in the weight of the munitions themselves, not just the chemical agent they contain. Nerve gas munitions comprise about two thirds of this total.

Overall the weight of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical munitions equals about a fourth of the weight of the conventional (high explosive) munitions the U.S. Army currently has on hand in Europe. Only a small fraction of this chemical weapons stockpile, however, has been portrayed abroad: on Johnston Island in the mid-Pacific and in West Germany. The stocks in West Germany, which are under exclusive U.S. control, are mostly ground munitions; it is said they would suffice for no more than two weeks of midscale battle by chemical operations in Europe.

If Administration and Congressional authorization is given, the next addition to the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile probably would be the 155 millimeter GB artillery projectile. Instead of containing actual nerve gas, it contains four nerve gas precursors held in separate canisters. When the projectile is fired, the containers break and their contents react to form the nerve gas while the munition is in flight. One of the canisters would be stored and shipped separately, to be loaded into the projectile at the gun site. This built-in safety feature of binary nerve gas munitions is intended to provide greater operational flexibility in the storage, shipment and deployment of chemical weapons, in view of elevated public concern about the possible unintended release of poison gas.

Little seems to be known outside the U.S.S.R. about the chemical weapons of that nation, either quantitatively or qualitatively. The Russians themselves have said nothing on the subject in public. Estimates of the size of the Russian stockpile that have appeared are based more on appraisals of assumed Russian military requirements than on solid evidence. U.S. defense officials have stated that little confidence can be placed in current estimates of the total size of the Russian stockpile, but that a considerable amount of it is deployed both in European forward areas and near the Chinese frontier. Part is believed to consist of nerve gas munitions, the remainder being mostly mustard gas and hydrogen cyanide.

Whether the Russians consider their stocks to be solely retaliatory, as the Americans consider theirs, is of course not known. A buildup in Russian supplies both of chemical weapons and of protective equipment, as said to have taken place in the late 1960's. If that is the case, the instigating decision would have been made during the last high point of U.S. chemical weapons procurement. According to the 1970 military posture statement by the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, annual release authority for the use of chemical weapons by the Russian forces lies at the level of the Politburo, the highest council of the Soviet state.

To a degree not approached by other categories of weapons, it is possible to protect people from the effects of chemical weapons without at the same time preventing them from engaging in most of their normal activities. Important and distinctive aspects of policymaking with regard to chemical weapons stem largely from this feature. The first and most important line of defense against chemical warfare agents (also needed in part against radioactive fallout) is the physical protection that respirators, special clothing and air filters for collective shelters can provide. Properly fitted gas masks are capable of reducing the concentration of chemical warfare agents inspired air by a factor of at least 100,000. The filters contain activated charcoal for vapor adsorption and paper or some similar material for retaining particulates. To increase protection against small molecule agents such as hydrogen cyanide, the charcoal is impregnated with copper compounds or other reactants. Gas masks currently deployed by NATO can be donned in less than 10 seconds and worn thereafter for long periods, even in sleep. The physiological stresses imposed are minor, and the psychological ones can be mitigated by training and practice. The new American mask, currently in an advanced stage of development, incorporates several refinements over the existing one. It is lighter and is designed to interface better with optical and radio equipment. The current Russian mask, although effective, is harder to don quickly than the principal NATO masks and is heavier and less comfortable.

All U.S. Army forces in Europe are equipped either with the British Mark 3 protective suit or with its more recently issued American counterpart. Each suit is a disposable two piece overgarment, which for full protection is worn with butyl rubber gloves and overboots. The American suit weighs four pounds and is water repellent and permeable to air. The outer layer of its two layers of fabric is wear resistant and treated to be rapidly wettable by droplets of nerve gas in order to accelerate their evaporation. Penetrating vapor is absorbed by activated carbon bonded to the inner layer. Because the material can "breathe" and passes perspiration, it interferes little with the body's ordinary clothing with the ability of its wearer to shed heat. At temperatures usually encountered in central Europe the degradation of combat performance in full protective gear attributable to heat stress is minimal. At temperatures higher than 75 or 80 degrees Fahrenheit, however, any periods of heavy exertion must be limited to about an hour if the protection is not to be partly vitiated, for example by removing the gloves and unzipping the front of the protective jacket. Current Russian protective garments are made of an impermeable rubberized fabric. At 60 degrees F. they can be worn for about four hours before heat stress builds up to casualty levels; above 70 degrees F. the tolerance time is less than half an hour. The Russians are said to be working on an improved suit.

For armored fighting vehicles collective rather than individual protection can be provided. The latest Russian and European NATO tanks have seals and positive pressure filtered air supplies so that their crews are fully protected without having to wear masks. The Russian forces appear to be relying increasingly on this method for the armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles in which their infantrymen would move during battle. The American preference is to provide armored vehicles with a central pressurized supply of filtered air to which individual respirators can be connected, making it possible to operate with the hatches open and allowing soldiers to enter and leave the vehicle. Full collective protection is limited to vehicles such as "command, control and communication" vans and certain mobile missile units. Collective protection is also available on both sides for fixed installations, including command posts and temporary shelters through which front line units can be rotated for medical care and rest.

NATO troops are trained to put on their masks and other protective equipment in response to commanders' orders, warnings given by chemical agent detection personnel or individual observation by a variety of means, including the sensing of chemical symptoms such as a runny nose, thinning saliva and tightness in the chest. The capacity for determining the proper degree of protection is being enhanced by the deployment of sensitive automatic field alarms for nerve gases. Such alarms are important because nerve gas exposure may be undetectable by the unaided human senses. One of the latest alarms in current service is a 10 pound device that measures the voltage across an electrochemical cell in which fluorine ions mobilized in electrolyte are continuously irrigated with a solution of hydrazine. Nitrogen and nitric oxide gas in the sampled air inhibits the current just as it would in the human body, resulting in a drop in the function level which triggers the alarm.

Gas masks and protective clothing can provide effective protection against nerve gas. If they should be circumvented, a second line of defense—the self administration of antidotes—is available to the individual. Antidotes would close only a few gaps when protective equipment had not been donned promptly enough or when it had become



U.S. EXPENDITURES for protective equipment against chemical attack have increased sharply in recent years as this country and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have sought to improve the anti-chemical-warfare capability of their forces in Europe. Both are based on constant 1973 dollars. Hatched bars indicate approximate planned levels of spending.



CHEMICAL STRUCTURES of three organophosphorus anticholinesterases, or nerve gases, currently in the arsenals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are given in their molecular diagrams. Reading from left to right, the compounds are O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (agent GB), O,1,2,2-tetramethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (agent GD, or soman) and O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (agent VX). Agents GB and VX are the two standard U.S. nerve gases. Agent GD is thought to be the standard Russian nerve gas.



ARTILLERY SHELLS designed to deliver the nerve gas GB in different ways are shown in these cutaway drawings. The 155 millimeter projectile at the top is the newest binary type munition now ready but not yet authorized for production. The one at the bottom is its stockpiled munitions equivalent. In the binary version one of the two canisters containing the ingredients to form GB can be stored and shipped separately, to be loaded at the gun site. When the projectile is fired, the contents of the two canisters mix and react to produce the lethal agent. The binary feature provides greater assurance against unintended release of nerve gas and facilitates possible disposal. The heavier casing and central location of the nonbinary round provide substantial fragmentation effects. Although the binary shell has more chemical, only about 70 percent of its payload ends up as GB, the other main product of the chemical reaction is hydrogen fluoride

damaged. They would also be necessary in the more remote eventuality that the military supply of impermeable fabrics of protective suits had become saturated under circumstances not allowing immediate replacement. The most widely available *antidote* is atropine which blocks acetylcholine at autonomic receptors and so counteracts the action of any nerve compound that can displace bound acetylcholine. Another established acetylcholinesterase reactivator is 2-PAM, commonly found in the United States and Russian ammunition referred to as 2-PAM, consists of trimedoxime although a second antagonist of acetylcholine, benactyzine. This antidote can save the lives of people receiving somewhat more than the median lethal dose of nerve gas and it can reduce the severity of symptoms due to sublethal doses.

Severer intoxication, up to several median lethal doses, can be countered only if positive pressure artificial respiration is also applied. Prophylactic use of atropine or reversible inhibitors of acetylcholinesterase such as pyridostigmine (administered by means of pills swallowed a short time before nerve gas exposure) may improve the prognosis. Notwithstanding the advances in therapy and prophylaxis that now seem possible, however, it is doubtful whether these medical defenses would significantly reduce casualties in the sense of soldiers put out of action although they could certainly save lives and bolster morale.

The third principal component of an NBC chemical protection consists of equipment and procedures for decontamination. Soldiers are provided with kits for decontaminating their skin and personal equipment. The other main requirement is a capacity for cleaning their essential combat and support equipment remains usable. The consideration that must be countered is that which focuses on the density of location would subject the overseas *the production* of the operations to be unacceptable to critical chemical

	NONCHEMICAL SHELLS		NERVE GAS SHELLS			
	FRAGMENTATION SEMIARMOR SHELL	ANTIARMOR HIGH-EXPLOSIVE SHELL	TARGET PERSONNEL UNPROTECTED	TARGET PERSONNEL CARRYING BUT NOT WEARING GAS MASKS AT START OF ATTACK	TARGET PERSONNEL WEARING GAS MASKS AT START OF ATTACK	TARGET PERSONNEL WEARING GAS MASKS AT START OF ATTACK
TARGET PERSONNEL ON THE ATTACK	3	4	1	2	14	
TARGET PERSONNEL ON THE DEFENSE	9	51	1	66	76	

NUMBERS OF SHELLS of different projectiles that would have to be fired by a battalion of 18 155 millimeter howitzers in order to inflict casualties of about 20 percent on a platoon size target (with a radius of 150 meters) in open terrain at a distance of 10 kilometers are estimated in this table. The figures take into account the differences between attackers and defenders with respect to their posture, breathing rate and time required to don their gas masks once the shells have started to fall. The fragmentation-submunition shell, one of a family of new munitions called Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) by the Army, detonates at a height of about 50 meters, releasing a cluster of 88 small antipersonnel bombs. For the nerve gas shells the number of salvos required would vary over at least an order of magnitude depending on the weather. The figures given here are midrange ones for a windy, overcast day with a gentle breeze

areas. This task can be accomplished with portable dispensers and sprinklers which are apt to decontaminating agents in close battle: grenades and shells remotely fuzed by time or proximity and the like. Better decontaminants are available as well as better detecting agents such as detecting powder. None available although perhaps not within at large scale decontamination equipment for use in regular exercises and staging areas. The Warsaw Pact nations have deployed large numbers of vehicles for chemical and radiological decontamination, including the BMP-based multiple-powered large volume dispenser first observed in the Soviet which is said to be capable when it is used in pairs of decontaminating the outer surfaces of a tank in less than three minutes.

The new protective items now being deployed by NATO in Europe are greatly increasing the capacity of the NATO forces for operating effectively in contaminated battlefields and for preserving support and resupply functions. Equipment, however, is only a part of what is needed. An adequate defense must also embody a detailed and widely diffused understanding of the problems involved, thorough training and exercising of personnel and an organization efficient enough to operate smoothly under the chaotic conditions of war, which large scale chemical operations would undoubtedly aggravate.

All the major NATO and Warsaw Pact armies provide training for antichemical protection at the individual level, but there are many tasks that must be done by groups requiring special equipment and expertise. Passive equipments such as filter clothing for biological and radiological defense and all three tasks (nuclear, biological and chemical) are generally organized together under the abbreviation NBC. The American practice is to assign such tasks to teams under local field command down to and including the company level, with key personnel in each team receiving more specialized NBC training. A typical U.S. Army company of between 100 and 150 men includes an NBC defense team to which 15 or more men are assigned, most of whom usually have other duties as well. The team includes a platoon groups assigned to chemical detection, radiological monitoring and decontamination. In addition there are career chemical specialty troops attached to brigades and higher command levels, such as the 20th Defense Companies activated for each U.S. combat division and each support command. The Russian organization, which is even more different from that of the West German army, places much more emphasis on career NBC troops organized as a separate branch of whom there are estimated to be approximately 50 000.

Antichemical defense procedures are

PROTECTIVE GEAR designed to defend soldiers against a chemical attack is modeled by a U.S. infantryman in this photograph released recently by the Army. The gas mask now in an advanced stage of development, incorporates three modes of activated charcoal for vapor adsorption and glass fibre for particle retention. The protective suit, a disposable two-piece, multilayered overgarment, is lightweight, water repellent and permeable to air. The outer layer of fabric is chemically treated to be rapidly destroyed by droplets of nerve gas in order to accelerate their evaporation, preventing vapor in adsorbed by a layer of activated charcoal bonded to the inner fabric layer. Full protection the suit is worn with butyl rubber gloves and overboots. Adhesive backed strips of detection paper are placed on the front, wrist and ankle. All U.S. troops in Europe are equipped with gas masks and protective clothing

EXCISE

Despite a profoundly changed geopolitical situation, the internal problems which have long plagued this demoralized country persist.

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[redacted] martial law is likely to continue indefinitely, though Pakistan is chronically unstable and predicting events risky.

US-Pak relations over the last several years have suffered from sharp ups and downs which have eroded confidence on both sides. Prior to the Soviet invasion, our bilateral relations had sharply deteriorated due to Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear explosive capability and our resulting aid cutoff (in April, 1979) in compliance with the Symington Amendment. The nadir was reached with the sacking of our Embassy on November 21. Following the Soviet invasion, we pledged publicly that we would assist Pakistan during this critical moment and we strongly urged our allies and the Saudis to increase their assistance very substantially. We prepared legislation for Congress which would have overriden the Symington Amendment, put the Congress on record as reaffirming our 1959 security agreement with Pakistan, and provided $400 million worth of economic aid and military sales credits spread over two fiscal years. Dr. Brzezinski and Warren Christopher carried this proposal to Islamabad in early February.

Pakistan's reaction to the Afghan crisis and our aid proposal reflects the shift in their international position in recent years. Once heavily dependent on the US for its security, Pakistan has gradually cultivated a network of other ties, including important links with China and Islamic countries. At Havana, Pakistan "pledged" the non-aligned fraternity. The US/Iranian confrontation vastly complicates our relations since Pakistan has sought close ties with revolutionary Iran, in part to placate domestic Muslim sentiment.

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Futhermore, over the years Pakistanis have felt that we were long on promises, but short on performance. They felt betrayed when we refused to provide military support during their 1965 and 1971 wars with India and are cynical about the value of the 1959 agreement. In their eyes our $400 million aid offer reflected a gross disparity between our rhetoric and their needs.

EXCISE

President Zia had publicly described our aid offer as "peanuts" and the invidious comparison was privately made with our Egyptian and Israeli programs. They felt particularly strongly that the $200 million military credit component was insufficient for their needs and it would only make them a Soviet target and complicate their relations with the Indians and the nonaligned world.

However the Pakistanis have since made it clear that they value the US link and hope for generous US economic aid and, most importantly, debt rescheduling.

Pakistan's rejection of our aid "package" roughly coincided with our budget-cutting exercise, and as a result no funds have been requested for economic assistance in FY 80 or 81. Their long-standing request for debt rescheduling presents us with a dilemma: if we adhere to our normal policy on debt rescheduling, we will lose the only opportunity for providing Pakistan with any economic support before FY 82; if we make a limited exception to our normal insistence on rescheduling only in cases of near-default, we will face Congressional problems, a possible stampede of other rescheduling requests, and the problem of dealing with the resulting increase in net budgetary expenditures. The President recently approved PRC recommendation instructing the agencies concerned to work Pakistan into aid plans for FY 82. The PRC postponed consideration of a request for the President to rule on the debt issue until after the passage of the first FY 81 budget resolution. We have not yet advised the Government of Pakistan of our inability to provide aid in FY 81, but will have to make clear our position or both aid and the debt issue when the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium meets June 12.

[redacted]

BI, AS

On the military side we are trying to keep a relationship going although this will be difficult as long as our confrontation with Iran continues. We have offered Pakistan assistance in building up its indigenous defense production and plan to continue selling military equipment on a cash basis.

[redacted]

EXCISE

In general all the old pre-Soviet invasion problems have come back to roost along with a few new ones. The nuclear issue in particular continues to trouble our relationship.

[redacted] B1, A5

A Pakistani explosion would seriously affect what little remains in our relationship, in addition to seriously destabilizing the region. Moreover a Pakistani nuclear explosion would be a serious blow to our global non proliferation policies by stimulating India to resume its explosives program while demonstrating to other potential proliferators our impotence in halting nuclear weapons development abroad.

[redacted] B1, A5

[redacted] B5

Finally it should be noted there is one bright spot in US-Pak relations -- narcotics. Last year Pakistan was the world's largest source country for illicit opium. This year, thanks in part to firm actions at the national and provincial level, opium cultivation is down by more than 50%. This may, however, be a temporary phenomenon. We are developing a number of programs with the GOP for controlling narcotics cultivation and trafficking and will continue to put a high priority on this aspect of our relationship.